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Agriculture in the United States has
long been shaped and molded by federal gov-
ernment attempts to enhance profitability
through a variety of government programs
and policies. Depending on the commodity
category selected, one can easily trace the
role of government in agriculture through
regulation, protection and price support pro-
grams. Government intervention in agriculture
not only affects what commodities and prod-
ucts are produced, but also the volume of
imports, exports and ultimately the distribution
of many commodities within the United States.
Within U.S. agriculture, there has tradi-
tionally been a dichotomy between the major
sectors of agriculture represented primarily by
food and feed grains and livestock, and the
so-called minor crops such as fruits and vege-
tables. For example, many food and feed
grains, as well as cotton, sugar and tobacco,
have been subject to a variety of price support
and income enhancement programs, while live-
stock and livestock products have experienced
a wide range of government regulations. Con-
versely, although most fruits and vegetables
have not experienced the same degree of gov-
ernment regulations, many have benefited
from the existence of federal market orders,
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In the past, many commodity producers
have taken pride in the fact that their com-
modities were not supported and regulated by
government programs. However, today, even
commodities with relatively little direct gov-
ernment program activity are subject to gov-
ernment policies which affect competition and
economic viability.
The influence of government policies
takes many forms. In addition to the tradi-
tional agricultural policies and programs noted
above, non-agricultural policies based on poli-
tical, economic and environmental objectives
are exerting influence at the international,
national, state and local levels.
Objectives
The purpose of this paper is to provide
an overview of the increasing impact of non-
agricultural policies and programs developed
by various levels of government on the import,
export and distribution of citrus. The United
States is the world’s largest importer and the
second largest producer and exporter of citrus,
which is susceptible to a wide variety of pests
and diseases. As such, the availability of
citrus in the U.S. food distribution system
and the competitiveness of U.S. citrus in dom-
estic and international markets is influenced
by a wide variety of government policies and
actions. Citrus is intended to serve as an
February 88/page 91example of how non-agricultural policies can
affect the food distribution system,
Federal Government Policies
Chemical Regulations
U.S. government policies affect the eco-
nomic well-being and competitiveness of citrus
directly through the regulation of chemicals.
The growing conditions necessary to produce
citrus generally serve as an excellent environ-
ment for a wide variety of plant pests and
diseases. Adequate and economic control of
citrus pests and diseases is accomplished
through integrated pest management programs
and the use of a variety of chemicals.
Cancellation of chemical usage not only
can affect production costs, output, and fruit
quality, but also the competitiveness of all or
a part of the U.S. citrus industry. Controlling
pests and diseases can increase productivity,
thus potentially lowering unit production -costs.
Reducing pest and disease damage through
chemical applications ~an improve fruit quality
and thus fruit marketability in fresh form.
Post-harvest fumigation or other quarantine
chemical treatments are often required to ship
fresh citrus fruit between citrus-producing
areas in an attempt to prevent the introduc-
tion of certain pests and diseases. Chemical
applications during the production season can
also serve to regulate the growth and matura-
tion of citrus and therefore the length of the
marketing season. The impact of government
chemical regulation policies on the U.S. citrus
industry is illustrated through two example~
lead arsenate and ethylene dibromide.
Lead Arsenatej, The Florida citrus in-
dustry uses lead arsenate to reduce the acidity
level in early season grapefruit. This allows
the maturity standards to be met earlier and
thus lengthens the marketing season. With
the use of lead arsenate, the Florida fresh
grapefruit marketing season begins in Septem-
ber under present maturity standards. Without
lead arsenate, the marketing season for Florida
fresh grapefruit would begin in mid-November.
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is considering the cancellation of lead
arsenate as an acidity-reducing growth regula-
tor on Florida grapefruit. EPA concern over
the use of lead arsenate as a growth regulator
relates primarily to applicator exposure. Ap-
plicator exposure consists mainly of spills
during the mixing/sprayer-loading process.
Currently, there are no alternative chemicals
registered for use as acidity-reducing growth
regulators on Florida grapefruit.
Florida grapefruit has represented 74
percent of total U.S. grapefruit production
during the past five seasons. Over the same
time period, Florida has accounted for 83
percent of early winter U.S. fresh grapefruit
sales prior to mid-November. The cancellation
of lead arsenate use in the Florida grapefruit
industry would be expected to have a signi-
ficant impact on the U.S. fresh grapefruit
market. Projected grapefruit production in-
creases in Florida and Texas combined with
sluggish domestic demand for both fresh and
processed grapefruit place increased importance
on lengthening the fresh grapefruit marketing
season. Loss of lead arsenate would serve to
depress further this market and limit the
availability of fresh grapefruit in the late
fall-early winter market.
Canceling lead arsenate without alterna-
tive chemical treatments would affect the
weekly prices and shipment volumes of fresh
Florida grapefruit. Inasmuch as changes in
FOB prices and revenues are generally reflect-
ed directly in changes in grower-level prices
and revenues, it is appropriate to assume that
changes in FOB revenue resulting from a lead
arsenate cancellation would be passed back to
the Florida grapefruit growers.
The average projected loss in annual
revenue to growers of fresh Florida white and
pink seedless grapefruit would be approximately
$1.1 million and $3.4 million for export and
domestic shipments, respectively. Perhaps
equally important would be the severely de-
pressed volume of fresh grapefruit available
for distribution during the late autumn to
early winter period.
~. The use of Ethylene Dibrornide
(EDB) as a post-harvest fruit fumigant is being
phased out by the EPA. 13DB has been used
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rida fresh citrus shipments to Japan as well
as to California, Arizona and Texas. The
purpose of such fumigation is to protect non-
infected citrus growing areas against the poss-
ible introduction of various fruit flies, e.g.,
Caribbean, Mediterranean and Mexican.
Following the EPA cancellation of EDB
as a fumigant for use on citrus sold in the
U.S. domestic market, Florida fresh citrus was
banned from entering the states of California,
Arizona and Texas. Although EDB is still
permitted for limited off-shore export ship-
ments, the scheduled phase-out of EDB will
be completed by the 1989-90 season. If an
acceptable alternative is not both approved by
the Japanese government and accepted by
Japanese fruit importers, then the Japanese
fresh citrus market will not be open to the
Florida citrus industry.
Currently, the Japanese market accounts
for nearly 9 million cartons of grapefruit an-
nually, which represents about 22 percent of
total Florida fresh grapefruit shipments and
60 percent of export shipments. The FOB
value of these export shipments totals approxi-
mately $50 million annually. The value of
lost sales of Florida fresh citrus to California,
Arizona and Texas represents an additional
$4.5 million annually.
Alternatives to EDB fumigation currently
being explored include gamma radiation, cold
treatment, fruit-fly-free zones, and methods
to suppress fruit fly populations such as para-
sites and predators. None of these alterna-
tives has proven to be completely adequate
and acceptable, although a combination of
fly-free zones and cold treatment may be
effective during part of the shipping season.
If alternative methods are not both perfected
and found acceptable to the Japanese govern-
ment, the Japanese market will be lost. The
situation with respect to distribution of Florida
fresh citrus in Texas, California and Arizona
has been complicated by a strain of citrus
canker in Florida citrus nurseries.
If the f“resh grapefruit volume which was
sold in markets requiring EDB is reallocated
to the domestic fresh and processed markets,
the estimated FOB revenue losses would range
from $4 million with a 100 percent reallocation
to the fresh market to $45 million with a 100
percent reallocation to the processed market.
Trade Policies
With the new Uruguay round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations now underway among
the nations of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT), it becomes extremely
important for those interested in the produc-
tion, marketing and distribution of food to
monitor international trade issues. Current ‘
and emerging trade issues are destined to
have a profound effect on both U.S. producers
and consumers of food and fiber. As a part
of the multilateral trade negotiations, President
Reagan has placed all U.S. import tariffs,
including agricultural tariffs, on the negotiat-
ing table. The mutual lowering and/or elimin-
ation of tariffs through negotiations is a
lengthy process, There are many practical
political and economic reasons for tracing out
a scenario in which many tariffs will remain
in place following the current round of nego-
tiations. However, the fact remains that all
U.S. agricultural tariffs are now subject to
elimination. The potential implications for
both U.S. agriculture and the food industry
are substantial.
In discussing trade policies and their
impact on the food production and distribution
system, it is important to realize that U.S.
political and economic objectives generally far
outweigh consideration of potential impacts on
agriculture and food production. This is par-
ticularly true for “off-season” or so-called
minor crops which include the fruit and vege-
table industry. It is unrealistic to expect
negative international trade impacts on one or
more commodities in the produce sector to
take precedence over positive benefits realized
by non-agricultural sectors of the economy.
In fact, international trade policies which
favor the larger, broader-based sectors of
agriculture such as food and feed grains, live-
stock, and selected commodities subject to
government support programs can be expected
to receive federal government endorsement at
the expense of the fruit and vegetable in-
dustry. Furthermore, any trade policy per-
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national security objectives can be expected
to prevail over consideration of negative im-
pacts on agriculture.
Import-sensitive commodities such as
most fruits and vegetables have much both to
gain and lose as the result of changing inter-
national trade policies and events. As such,
it is imperative that producers and marketers
stay well informed on trade issues and attempt
to influence and adjust to programs and poli-
cies which affect supply and demand condi-
tions.
The U.S. citrus industry has a long his-
tory of involvement in international trade
issues. Efforts have focused on maintaining
the integrity of the U.S. tariff structure, de-
veloping export markets for fresh and pro-
cessed citrus, and reducing unjustified barriers
to trade.
The United States both imports and ex-
ports citrus. Although the United States is
the largest producer of grapefruit and second
largest producer of oranges in the world,
citrus imports into the United States have
been substantial. In 1986, the value of all
citrus imports totalled $544 million while U.S.
citrus exports totalled $572 million. The
United States is a major exporter of fresh
citrus and a major importer of orange juice
as the result of freeze-reduced production
primarily in Florida.
In recent years, the U.S. citrus industry
has been almost continuously involved in de-
fending the U.S. citrus tariff structure from
attack and circumvention. Analyses of the
impact of the citrus tariff on imports indicate
that the present tariff structure, at least for
processed oranges, has permitted imports in
short crop seasons and helped to moderate
imports in seasons when additional supplies
were not needed, Thus, the tariff has pro-
vided some protection for domestic producers
when needed, but has allowed imports to enter
when supplies were low, resulting in flat real
prices.
Unilateral Ameements. The Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 serves
as an example of a policy designed to meet
political objectives, that has the potential of
encouraging duty-free imports which would
compete with the U.S. citrus industry, as well
as with other U.S.-produced commodities.
The United States unilaterally enacted the
law that created the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) with the intent to foster economic
growth in 27 small neighboring Caribbean
Basin countries through trade, economic assist-
ance and tax measures. It was assumed that
such growth would protect the national secur-
ity, as well as the economic and political in-
terests of the United States by creating more
political stability in the region and reducing
the chances of. unfriendly governments coming
into power,
The principal component of the CBI is
the provision of duty-free access to U.S. mar-
kets for a twelve-year period. Moreover,
Congress is currently considering proposals to
extend the duty-free period to the year 2007.
Nearly all agricultural products from CBI coun-
tries are eligible for duty-free status except
textiles and apparel, canned tuna, footwear
and certain leather products; there are some
restrictions on sugar and rum, Other features
include rule-of -origin requirements, restrictions
on non-CBI-produced components and simple
product transformations, and provisions for
reinstatement of duties if CBI imports cause
or threaten to cause serious damage to agri-
culture. Moreover, perishable commodities,
including fresh and concentrated citrus, are
provided with a fast-track procedure through
which duties can be reinstated within 21 days.
Citrus industry concerns about the CBI
have centered on the potential for transship-
ment of Brazilian FCOJ through CBI countries
to avoid the tariff, potential competition from
CBI citrus production, and introduction of
plant pests and diseases from Caribbean coun-
tries. Orange and grapefruit production in
the Caribbean has been increasing over time.
While U.S. imports of citrus products have
increased dramatically in percentage terms
since the CBI became effective, the absolute
volume increases have been extremely small.
Several factors may serve to limit in--
vestment in Caribbean Basin citrus and thus
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length of time and capital investment required
to establish commercial producing groves and
cost-effective processing plants relative to
the twelve- year limit on duty-free access to
the U.S. market may limit the competitive
threat in the next decade. However, the
twelve-year limit may be extended. Political
and/or economic instability of many Caribbean
countries may serve to limit foreign investment
even though economic and political factors
are considered favorable to both domestic and
foreign investment in some countries.
The ability of Caribbean citrus operations
to be cost-competitive in all stages from pro-
duction, harvesting and transportation to pack-
ing and processing operations may be limited
by an inadequate infrastructure of transporta-
tion and other facilitating functions. There
appears to be a limited amount of land in CBI
countries with the correct combination of soil
and climate to produce citrus with the quality
characteristics needed to compele in U.S.
fresh and processed citrus markets. Cultural
practices in many CBI countries are still in
experimental stages and may serve to limit
production potential in the short run.
The CBI may result in increased invest-
ment in citrus, with resulting increases in
production and exports, However, the amount
of such increases is uncertain at this time
due to a number of factors which will affect
investment, plantings, productivity, costs and
quality. While the Caribbean Basin Initiative
may not result in significant competition to
the U.S. citrus industry, it does serve as an
excellent example of how non-agricultural “
policies can potentially affect the competitive
position of U.S. agriculture.
Bilateral Ameement~. In addition to the
unilateral trade policy adopted by the U.S.
government in the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
the United States has been and is involved in
bilateral free-trade agreements with other
countries which result in lower-priced citrus
imports. The first example is the Israeli-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement developed in 1984 which
phases out the U.S. tariff requirements for
Israel beginning in 1990. Israel is the world’s
second largest producer of grapefruit, and
ranks seventh in orange production and tenth
in tangerine production. Israel imports orange
juice, primarily from Brazil, and regularly
exports more orange juice than it produces.
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
currently being finalized serves as the second
example of a bilateral trade action of concern
to the U.S. citrus industry. While traditionally
Canada has not been known as a major citrus
producer, it still looms as a competitive threat
to the U.S. citrus industry, particularly t~e
processed orange sector. This concern IS
based on two factors. First, Canada does not
have an import tariff on orange juice, which
could enable third-party countries such as
Brazil to import ,orange juice into Canada and
ship it into U.S. markets duty-free in the
absence of manufacture and transit restric-
tions. The fact that this is physically possible
is supported by average annual U.S. imports
of three million SSE gallons of orange juice
from Canada. Second, the import-duty-draw-
back provisions of the U.S. citrus tariff struc-
ture will not be applicable to U.S. exports to
Canada without a specific addendum to the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. This
feature may further limit the U.S. citrus in-
dustry’s ability to compete in foreign markets,
Trad e Barriers. In addition to competi-
tive pressures in the processed orange market
from Brazil and other citrus producers/ex-
porters, the U.S. citrus industry faces numer-
ous barriers to trade in foreign markets.
While trade policies protect viable industries
in some cases, in many cases protectionist
trade policies serve no such purpose. Barriers
to citrus trade, particularly in the European
Economic Community (EEC) and Japan, have
been a continuing concern to the U.S. citrus
industry.
In spite of the low level of citrus pro-
duction in the EEC relative to population, the
EEC imposes preferential duty treatment on
imports of citrus and citrus products which
hampers the competitive position of the United
States in the world citrus market. For
example, preferential duty treatment reduces
EEC tariffs on citrus juices imported from
Israel by 70 percent. This preferential duty
situation is one of the key factors in the
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tween the United States and the EEC.
Under a proposed settlement agreement,
the EEC will improve access to EEC markets
for U.S. citrus products in return for trade
concessions. However, quantity restrictions
were included to complement lower tariff rates
offered by EEC. Lower tariff rates were ap-
plied to the restrictive quantity, and the old
tariff rates were applied to quantities imported
above the established quantity restriction. In
effect, the quantity restrictions limited severe-
ly the impact of the lower tariffs. The agree-
ment also limits the United States from claim-
ing future damage arising from the EEC-
Mediterranean Basin preferential treatment.
Given the limited relief provided to the U.S.
citrus industry under the agreement, it is
obvious that the United States may have lost
the Citrus-Pasta War.
In addition to tariffs and preferential
trade agreements, the United States faces
quantitative restrictions in some potentially
large markets. For example, Japan currently
has an orange juice quota which is equivalent
to a 7.5-ounce serving of orange juice on an
annual per capita basis. The Japanese have
imposed a blending requirement that imported
juice be blended with juice produced in Japan.
Prior to 1971, Japan had also limited imports
of fresh grapefruit, even though Japan did
not produce this citrus product, Since the
quota has been lifted, exports of fresh grape-
fruit to Japan have grown significantly, and
the United States has been a major benefactor.
There are many other examples of trade
restrictions that limit the competitive position
of the U.S. citrus industry in world markets.
The question is whether U.S. government trade
policies and negotiations place enough emphasis
on citrus and other fruits and vegetables to
provide adequate opportunities to compete in
international markets.
General Economic Policies
That U.S. agriculture is influenced by
the world economy is well documented. Inter-
national agricultural markets, world- wide
economic conditions, and the programs and
policies of foreign governments all serve to
define the competitive environment for U.S.
agriculture. The U.S. food industry must re-
cognize that not only do U.S. economic poli-
cies affect food production and consumption
directly through impacts on costs, employment,
income and inflation, but also through links
to the world economy and international mar-
kets. U.S. fiscal and monetary policies affect
the value of the dollar and exchange rates,
which, in turn, affect the import-export bal-
ances in goods and services as well as finan-
cial markets.
The interconnection of world markets
and the effect of U.S. economic policies play
a leading role in production and marketing of
citrus. For example, even though the United
States exports a relatively small quantity of
orange juice to Europe, the currency exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and European
currencies affect the level of Brazilian orange
juice imports into the United States. This is
because Brazil prices orange juice in U.S.
dollars. The strong rise in the value of the
dollar between 1983 and 1986 in conjunction
with a rise in Brazilian orange juice prices
combined to nearly quadruple the price of
Brazilian orange juice to European consumers.
The ensuing decline in quantity demanded
resulted in increased Brazilian imports into
the United States, thus depressing prices to
U.S. producers.
Export markets for U.S. fresh grapefruit
also serve as examples of the indirect impacts
of U.S. economic policies. Variations in ex-
change rates have been demonstrated to have
varying impacts on the demand structure for
U.S. fresh grapefruit among export markets.
These examples serve to indicate the extensive
nature of the impacts of U.S. economic policies
on food distribution.
Implications
The U.S. citrus industry has served to
illustrate some of the many ways in which an
agricultural industry is affected by U.S. gov-
ernment policies and regulations. The inter-
national flavor associated with many of the
examples is indicative of the degree of inter-
national involvement which permeates not
February 88/page 96 Journal of Food Distribution Researchonly the U.S. citrus industry, but also the
agricultural/food sector and U.S. government
policies.
Government policies and regulations at
the federal level are not the only such con-
cern of the U.S. citrus industry. State and
local government regulations ranging from
state-legislated chemical tolerances in ground
water to water management district use per-
mits and local land-use regulations are having
a profound impact on the economic well-being
and future of the U.S. citrus industry.
Government policies and associated im-
pacts and implications must be monitored and
analyzed, not only by the citrus industry, but
by all participants in the U.S. food produc-
tion/marketing system. It is imperative that
government policy formulation be influenced
whenever possible, that impacts be anticipated
and that adjustments be made as quickly and
as inexpensively as possible. Future success
in the food production and distribution system
will be determined by such actions.
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